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he Federal Open Market Com  mittee
(FOMC) has maintained the federal
funds rate near zero since December
2008 and has indicated that it will continue
to do so for an “extended period.” Some
analysts and policymakers, most notably
Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, have suggested
that this policy has significantly inflated
asset prices.1 This essay discusses the policy
and the potential effects.
The charts provide a visual representa-
tion of a potential cause for concern: Both
charts show the FOMC’s target for the fed-
eral funds rate since January 1990 (refer to
the left y-axis), relative to a 4 percent bench-
mark. This benchmark reflects two com-
ponents: a historical real rate of return on
default-risk-free assets of about 2 percent
plus an FOMC inflation objective of about
2 percent. This 4 percent benchmark is a
neutral nominal funds rate target—that is,
one consistent with the FOMC’s inflation
objective. A funds rate target above 4 per-
cent can be seen as a restrictive policy (dark
blue); a target below 4 percent can be seen
as an easy policy (light blue). The charts
show that the funds rate target has been
exceptionally and persistently low relative
to this benchmark since the early 2000s.
The first chart’s dotted line shows the
real funds rate target (refer to the right 
y-axis), calculated as the nominal funds
rate target minus the year-over-year con-
sumer price index (CPI) inflation rate over
the preceding year, relative to the 2 percent
real rate benchmark noted above. By this
measure, the real funds rate target has been
not only persistently below the 2 percent
benchmark over the past decade but, more often than not,
negative.
Policymakers are aware of the possibility that a persistent
policy of exceptionally low interest rates could result in a
misallocation of credit and inflate asset prices. For example,
at the March 16, 2004, FOMC meeting, Governor Donald
Kohn first noted that the FOMC’s “accommodative policy”
should narrow the output gap more quickly than it had been
Is the FOMC’s Policy Inflating Asset Prices?
Daniel L. Thornton, Vice President and Economic Adviser













































Nominal Funds Rate Target











Nominal Funds Rate Target


































9narrowing and then described more serious concerns: “Policy
accommodation—and the expectation that it will persist—is
distorting asset prices. Most of this distortion is deliberate and
a desirable effect of the stance of policy. We have attempted
to lower interest rates below long-term equilibrium rates and
to boost asset prices in order to stimulate demand. But as
members of the Committee have been pointing out, it’s hard
to escape the suspicion that at least around the margin some
prices and price relationships have gone beyond an economi-
cally justified response to easy policy. House prices fall into
this category…” He went on: “If major distortions do exist,
two types of costs might be incurred. One is from a misallo-
cation of resources encouraging the building of houses, autos,
and capital equipment that won’t prove economically justified
under more-normal circumstances. Another is from the pos-
sibility of discontinuities in economic activity down the road
when the adjustment to more-sustainable asset values occurs.”
He concluded by saying that neither concern was “sufficient
to overcome the arguments for remaining patient awhile
longer.”2
John Taylor and others have argued that the FOMC’s policy
of maintaining its funds rate target at (then) historically low
levels in the early 2000s contributed to a bubble in house
prices and that the FOMC bears some responsibility for the
financial crisis.3 Consistent with this hypothesis, the propor-
tion of subprime loans made using variable-rate mortgages
(i.e., mortgages with rates that were most affected by the
FOMC’s interest rate policy) increased substantially during
this period.4
Keeping the policy rate significantly and persistently
below “long-run equilibrium rates” may inflate the prices of
other assets as well. Economic agents with revenues in excess
of expenditures can either lend or purchase real assets. With
the real rate significantly below its equilibrium level, it is rea-
sonable to assume that some investors might purchase real
assets rather than lend at very low or negative real rates. One
possibility is investors could purchase commodities—for
example, industrial and precious metals or petroleum—
rather than lend.5 This possibility is supported by the second
chart, which shows the S&P spot commodity price index and
periods of tight and easy policy relative to the long-run equi-
librium rate. The commodity price index remained relatively
constant from 1990 through late 2001, when the funds rate
target was reduced significantly below the long-run equilibrium
level, and then rose dramatically. The index leveled off as the
policy rate approached and went above the equilibrium level
before falling dramatically but temporarily in mid-September
2008. The commodity price index rebounded significantly
despite relatively sluggish economic growth and anemic
employment growth.
Of course, asset prices are global and the Fed is not the
only central bank that has pursued an aggressively easy mone-
tary policy. Moreover, the second chart is only suggestive.
The dramatic increase in commodity prices since the early
2000s could be due to other factors independent of central
banks’ interest rate policies. For example, the increased demand
associated with a shift to commodities being assets in a port-
folio should increase asset prices independent of Fed policy.
Nevertheless, the extent to which excessively low nominal
interest rates may affect a wide range of asset prices is an
important research and policy question. If such an environ-
ment induces economic agents to switch from lending to
investing in commodities, the result could be a commodity
price bubble: As more investors purchase commodities, com-
modity prices rise, which causes more investors to view com-
modities as an attractive alternative to lending, causing com-
modity prices to rise even further, and so on and so forth.
Once commodity prices rise to an unsustainable level—for
example, if industrial metal prices rise to a level that cannot
be sustained by the prices of the products they are used to
produce—or policymakers return the policy rate to or above
the equilibrium level, the bubble will burst. This possibility
raises the question today: Are we getting the ill effects of
such a policy without an appreciable increase in aggregate
demand? ■
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Keeping the policy rate 
significantly and persistently below
“long-run equilibrium rates” 
may inflate asset prices.